KiHoLee
37392bc38f
Reproducibility package for the TIFS submission: transmit and receive core, security stages (eavesdropper, jamming, key families, attack difficulty, known-plaintext), real BERT token streams, closed-form verification, and the scripts that regenerate every figure and table from the released CSVs.
524 lines
22 KiB
Python
524 lines
22 KiB
Python
"""Full-scale security evaluation for paper 11 (run under WSL CUDA).
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Reuses the SSE transmit/receive core from sse_lib.py and adds an
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eavesdropper receiver, a jammer channel, and structured mask families.
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Main configuration d=64, P=4, Vu=16 (V=Vu^P=65,536), U=4 users, matching
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the language-model token vocabulary scale.
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Stages (each writes a CSV to ../data; figures come from replot_security.py
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and the two result tables from make_tables.py):
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A security vs SNR -> sec_snr.csv (Fig. 2)
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B key length -> sec_keylen.csv (Fig. 3)
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C jamming vs JSR -> sec_jam.csv (Fig. 4)
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D mask families -> sec_maskfam.csv (key-family table)
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E scheme comparison -> sec_compare.csv (comparison table)
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F attack difficulty -> sec_sens.csv, sec_brute.csv (Figs. 5-6)
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Experiment scripts write CSV only, never draw. Fixed seeds.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import math
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import numpy as np
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import torch
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import sse_lib as L
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from sse_lib import (SSE, rayleigh_gain, snr_to_sigma2, write_csv, set_seed,
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eval_ser_sse, oma_ser, DATA, DEVICE)
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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# eavesdropper: correlate the transmitted (true-mask) frame with a
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# substitute mask the eavesdropper does not truly hold.
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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@torch.no_grad()
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def eval_ser_eve(model: SSE, eve_masks: torch.Tensor, snr_list,
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frames: int, chunk: int = 100_000, seed: int = 777):
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model.eval().to(DEVICE)
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Bn = model.unit_codebook()
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true_m = model.masks()
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eve_masks = eve_masks.to(DEVICE)
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c = model.c
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out = []
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for snr_db in snr_list:
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g = torch.Generator(device="cpu").manual_seed(seed + int(10 * snr_db))
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err = tot = 0
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for n0 in range(0, frames, chunk):
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n = min(chunk, frames - n0)
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digits = torch.randint(model.vu, (n, model.users, model.P),
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generator=g).to(DEVICE)
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e = Bn[digits] / math.sqrt(model.P)
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y = (e * true_m[None, :, None, :]).sum(dim=1) / c
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h = rayleigh_gain((n, model.users), device=DEVICE)
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sigma = snr_to_sigma2(snr_db, model.d).to(DEVICE).sqrt()
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noise = torch.randn(n, model.users, model.P, model.L, device=DEVICE)
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y_rx = h[:, :, None, None] * y[:, None] + sigma * noise
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r = y_rx / h[:, :, None, None].clamp_min(1e-6)
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cand = Bn[None, :, :] * eve_masks[:, None, :]
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scores = torch.einsum("nupl,uvl->nupv", r, cand)
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wrong = (scores.argmax(-1) != digits).any(dim=2)
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err += int(wrong.sum()); tot += n * model.users
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out.append(err / tot)
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return out
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@torch.no_grad()
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def eval_ser_jam(model: SSE, snr_db, jsr_db_list, frames: int,
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chunk: int = 100_000, seed: int = 777, mode: str = "blind",
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target: int = 0):
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"""Returns the target-user SER (user `target`, the user a mask-matched
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jammer aims at). The mask-matched jammer aligns with the target key,
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which a mask-blind jammer cannot do. Reporting the target-user SER,
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rather than the user average, isolates how efficiently each jammer can
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degrade a chosen victim (Proposition 2)."""
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model.eval().to(DEVICE)
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Bn = model.unit_codebook()
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true_m = model.masks()
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c = model.c
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sigma = snr_to_sigma2(snr_db, model.d).to(DEVICE).sqrt()
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# matched jammer aligns with the target user's masked codeword mean
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# direction (needs that user's secret key)
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w_fixed = (Bn[target][None, :] * true_m[target][None, :]).repeat(model.P, 1)
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w_fixed = w_fixed / w_fixed.norm()
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out = []
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for jsr_db in jsr_db_list:
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jsr = 10.0 ** (jsr_db / 10.0)
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g = torch.Generator(device="cpu").manual_seed(seed + int(10 * jsr_db))
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err = tot = 0
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for n0 in range(0, frames, chunk):
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n = min(chunk, frames - n0)
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digits = torch.randint(model.vu, (n, model.users, model.P),
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generator=g).to(DEVICE)
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e = Bn[digits] / math.sqrt(model.P)
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y = (e * true_m[None, :, None, :]).sum(dim=1) / c
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h = rayleigh_gain((n, model.users), device=DEVICE)
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hJ = rayleigh_gain((n,), device=DEVICE)
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if mode == "matched":
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w = w_fixed[None].expand(n, model.P, model.L)
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else:
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w = torch.randn(n, model.P, model.L, device=DEVICE)
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w = w / w.reshape(n, -1).norm(dim=1)[:, None, None].clamp_min(1e-8)
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jam = (hJ * math.sqrt(jsr))[:, None, None] * w
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noise = torch.randn(n, model.users, model.P, model.L, device=DEVICE)
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y_rx = h[:, :, None, None] * y[:, None] + jam[:, None] + sigma * noise
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r = y_rx / h[:, :, None, None].clamp_min(1e-6)
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cand = Bn[None, :, :] * true_m[:, None, :]
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scores = torch.einsum("nupl,uvl->nupv", r, cand)
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wrong = (scores.argmax(-1) != digits).any(dim=2) # (n,U)
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err += int(wrong[:, target].sum()); tot += n
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out.append(err / tot)
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return out
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def hadamard(n: int) -> np.ndarray:
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"""Sylvester construction, n a power of two."""
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H = np.array([[1.0]])
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while H.shape[0] < n:
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H = np.block([[H, H], [H, -H]])
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return H
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def mean_abs_xcorr(masks: torch.Tensor) -> float:
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m = masks / masks.norm(dim=1, keepdim=True).clamp_min(1e-8)
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G = (m @ m.T).abs()
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U = m.shape[0]
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off = G[~torch.eye(U, dtype=torch.bool, device=G.device)]
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return float(off.mean())
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def random_mask(U, Lp):
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W = torch.randn(U, Lp)
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return W / W.norm(dim=1, keepdim=True) * math.sqrt(Lp)
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def eve_wrong_mask(U, Lp, seed):
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g = torch.Generator().manual_seed(seed)
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W = torch.randn(U, Lp, generator=g)
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return W / W.norm(dim=1, keepdim=True) * math.sqrt(Lp)
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def get_model(P=4, vu=16, d=64, U=4, iters=4000, seed=1, freeze_W=None, tag=""):
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"""Train an SSE model, optionally with fixed (frozen) masks."""
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set_seed(seed)
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m = SSE(P=P, vu=vu, d=d, users=U).to(DEVICE)
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if freeze_W is not None:
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with torch.no_grad():
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m.W.copy_(freeze_W.to(DEVICE))
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m.W.requires_grad_(False)
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L.train_sse(m, iters=iters, batch=256, lr=3e-3, seed=seed)
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m.calibrate_power()
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return m
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def stage_A():
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print("[A] security vs SNR (V=65536) ...")
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m = get_model(iters=4000)
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snr = [0.0, 4.0, 8.0, 12.0, 16.0, 20.0]
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frames = 800_000
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legit = eval_ser_sse(m, snr, frames=frames)
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ew = eve_wrong_mask(m.users, m.L, seed=20260813).to(DEVICE)
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eve_w = eval_ser_eve(m, ew, snr, frames=frames)
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eve_n = eval_ser_eve(m, torch.ones(m.users, m.L), snr, frames=frames)
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# conventional public-mask scheme: the eavesdropper holds the same
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# (public) masks and decodes exactly like a legitimate user
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eve_p = eval_ser_eve(m, m.masks().detach().cpu(), snr, frames=frames)
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oma = oma_ser(snr, bits=int(math.log2(m.V)))
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chance = 1.0 - (1.0 / m.vu) ** m.P
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write_csv(DATA / "sec_snr.csv",
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["snr_db", "legit", "eve_wrong", "eve_none", "eve_public",
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"oma", "chance"],
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[(s, legit[i], eve_w[i], eve_n[i], eve_p[i], oma[i], chance)
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for i, s in enumerate(snr)])
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print(" legit:", [f"{v:.2e}" for v in legit])
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print(" eve :", [f"{v:.3f}" for v in eve_w])
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def train_sse_reg(m: SSE, iters=4000, batch=256, lr=3e-3, seed=1,
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lam_orth=1.0, lam_flat=0.1):
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"""Regularized key learning for improved spreading and de-spreading.
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Adds to the digit-wise cross entropy (i) an orthogonality penalty on
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the off-diagonal key Gram entries, which reduces cross-user
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interference and residual leakage, and (ii) a constant-modulus
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penalty that flattens the key spectrum, which maximizes the spreading
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of a mask-blind jammer (Proposition 2: the jammer concentration on
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candidate i is sum_k w_k^2 e_{i,k}^2 weighted through the key, and a
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flat key removes any low-energy entries a jammer could exploit)."""
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set_seed(seed)
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m.to(DEVICE)
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opt = torch.optim.Adam(m.parameters(), lr=lr)
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ce = torch.nn.CrossEntropyLoss()
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for it in range(1, iters + 1):
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digits = torch.randint(m.vu, (batch, m.users, m.P), device=DEVICE)
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snr = torch.empty(batch).uniform_(0.0, 20.0)
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m.calibrate_power(8192)
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scores = m(digits, snr) * m.logit_scale.exp()
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loss = ce(scores.reshape(-1, m.vu), digits.reshape(-1))
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mk = m.masks()
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G = (mk @ mk.T) / m.L
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off = G - torch.eye(m.users, device=G.device)
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loss = loss + lam_orth * off.pow(2).sum()
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loss = loss + lam_flat * (mk.pow(2) - 1.0).pow(2).mean()
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opt.zero_grad(); loss.backward(); opt.step()
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m.calibrate_power()
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return m
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def get_model_reg(P=4, vu=16, d=64, U=4, iters=4000, seed=1):
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set_seed(seed)
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m = SSE(P=P, vu=vu, d=d, users=U).to(DEVICE)
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train_sse_reg(m, iters=iters, seed=seed)
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return m
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def stage_B():
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print("[B] key length (dense grid so the curve is smooth) ...")
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oma10 = oma_ser([10.0], bits=16)[0]
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rows = []
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for d in [16, 24, 32, 48, 64, 96, 128, 192, 256]:
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m = get_model(d=d, iters=4000)
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lg = eval_ser_sse(m, [10.0], frames=500_000)[0]
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ew = eve_wrong_mask(m.users, m.L, seed=20260813).to(DEVICE)
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ev = eval_ser_eve(m, ew, [10.0], frames=500_000)[0]
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xc = mean_abs_xcorr(m.masks().detach())
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rows.append((m.L, d, lg, ev, xc, oma10))
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print(f" L={m.L:4d} legit={lg:.2e} eve={ev:.3f} xcorr={xc:.4f}")
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write_csv(DATA / "sec_keylen.csv",
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["L", "d", "legit_ser", "eve_ser", "mask_xcorr", "oma"], rows)
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def stage_C():
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print("[C] jamming vs JSR ...")
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m = get_model(iters=4000)
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jsr = [-10.0, -5.0, 0.0, 5.0, 10.0, 15.0, 20.0]
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blind = eval_ser_jam(m, 10.0, jsr, frames=500_000, mode="blind", target=0)
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matched = eval_ser_jam(m, 10.0, jsr, frames=500_000, mode="matched", target=0)
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# target-user SER with no jammer, for the reference line
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nojam = eval_ser_jam(m, 10.0, [-40.0], frames=500_000, mode="blind",
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target=0)[0]
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write_csv(DATA / "sec_jam.csv",
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["jsr_db", "blind", "matched", "nojam"],
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[(j, blind[i], matched[i], nojam) for i, j in enumerate(jsr)])
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print(f" target no-jam={nojam:.2e}")
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print(" blind :", [f"{v:.3f}" for v in blind])
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print(" matched:", [f"{v:.3f}" for v in matched])
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def stage_D():
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print("[D] mask families ...")
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P, vu, d, U = 4, 16, 64, 4
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Lp = d // P
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fams = {}
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# random fixed masks
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set_seed(7); fams["random"] = random_mask(U, Lp)
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# Walsh-Hadamard rows (orthogonal)
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Hd = torch.tensor(hadamard(Lp)[:U], dtype=torch.float32) # ||row||=sqrt(Lp)
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fams["hadamard"] = Hd
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rows = []
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for name, W in fams.items():
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m = get_model(P=P, vu=vu, d=d, U=U, iters=4000, freeze_W=W)
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lg = eval_ser_sse(m, [10.0], frames=500_000)[0]
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ew = eve_wrong_mask(U, Lp, seed=20260813).to(DEVICE)
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ev = eval_ser_eve(m, ew, [10.0], frames=500_000)[0]
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xc = mean_abs_xcorr(m.masks().detach())
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rows.append((name, lg, ev, xc))
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print(f" {name:9s} legit={lg:.2e} eve={ev:.3f} xcorr={xc:.4f}")
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# learned masks (plain cross entropy)
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m = get_model(P=P, vu=vu, d=d, U=U, iters=4000)
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lg = eval_ser_sse(m, [10.0], frames=500_000)[0]
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ew = eve_wrong_mask(U, Lp, seed=20260813).to(DEVICE)
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ev = eval_ser_eve(m, ew, [10.0], frames=500_000)[0]
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xc = mean_abs_xcorr(m.masks().detach())
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rows.append(("learned", lg, ev, xc))
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print(f" {'learned':9s} legit={lg:.2e} eve={ev:.3f} xcorr={xc:.4f}")
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# regularized key learning (orthogonality + constant modulus)
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mr = get_model_reg(P=P, vu=vu, d=d, U=U, iters=4000)
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lgr = eval_ser_sse(mr, [10.0], frames=500_000)[0]
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evr = eval_ser_eve(mr, ew, [10.0], frames=500_000)[0]
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xcr = mean_abs_xcorr(mr.masks().detach())
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rows.append(("learned_reg", lgr, evr, xcr))
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print(f" {'learn_reg':9s} legit={lgr:.2e} eve={evr:.3f} xcorr={xcr:.4f}")
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# jamming robustness of plain vs regularized keys (blind jammer)
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jsr = [-10.0, -5.0, 0.0, 5.0, 10.0, 15.0, 20.0]
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jb_plain = eval_ser_jam(m, 10.0, jsr, frames=300_000, mode="blind")
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jb_reg = eval_ser_jam(mr, 10.0, jsr, frames=300_000, mode="blind")
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write_csv(DATA / "sec_regjam.csv",
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["jsr_db", "plain", "regularized"],
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[(j, jb_plain[i], jb_reg[i]) for i, j in enumerate(jsr)])
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write_csv(DATA / "sec_maskfam.csv",
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["family", "legit_ser", "eve_ser", "mask_xcorr"], rows)
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@torch.no_grad()
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def eval_scheme(model: SSE, snr_db, frames, *, rx_masks=None, perms=None,
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jam_w=None, jsr_db=None, target=0, chunk=100_000, seed=777,
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decode_user=0):
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"""Generic evaluator for the comparison schemes.
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rx_masks: masks used at the decoding receiver (None = true masks).
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perms: (U,d-index) per-user secret permutations applied at tx to
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x_u; the decoder for `decode_user` inverse-permutes first.
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rx side without the permutation just decodes raw.
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jam_w: None or 'matched'/'blind' jammer aimed at `target`.
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Returns SER of `decode_user` (frame error over its P digits)."""
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model.eval().to(DEVICE)
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Bn = model.unit_codebook()
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true_m = model.masks()
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c = model.c
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sigma = snr_to_sigma2(snr_db, model.d).to(DEVICE).sqrt()
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d = model.P * model.L
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if perms is not None:
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inv = torch.argsort(perms, dim=1)
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if jam_w == "matched":
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wf = (Bn[target][None, :] * true_m[target][None, :]).repeat(model.P, 1)
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if perms is not None:
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wfl = wf.reshape(-1)[perms[target]]
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wf = wfl.reshape(model.P, model.L)
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wf = wf / wf.norm()
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jsr = 10.0 ** (jsr_db / 10.0) if jsr_db is not None else 0.0
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g = torch.Generator(device="cpu").manual_seed(seed + int(10 * snr_db))
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err = tot = 0
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for n0 in range(0, frames, chunk):
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n = min(chunk, frames - n0)
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digits = torch.randint(model.vu, (n, model.users, model.P),
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generator=g).to(DEVICE)
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e = Bn[digits] / math.sqrt(model.P)
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x = e * true_m[None, :, None, :] # (n,U,P,L)
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if perms is not None:
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xf = x.reshape(n, model.users, d)
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xf = torch.stack([xf[:, u][:, perms[u]] for u in range(model.users)], 1)
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x = xf.reshape(n, model.users, model.P, model.L)
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y = x.sum(dim=1) / c # (n,P,L)
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h = rayleigh_gain((n,), device=DEVICE) # decode_user channel
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y_rx = h[:, None, None] * y # (n,P,L)
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if jam_w is not None:
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hJ = rayleigh_gain((n,), device=DEVICE)
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if jam_w == "matched":
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w = wf[None].expand(n, model.P, model.L)
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else:
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w = torch.randn(n, model.P, model.L, device=DEVICE)
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w = w / w.reshape(n, -1).norm(dim=1)[:, None, None].clamp_min(1e-8)
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y_rx = y_rx + (hJ * math.sqrt(jsr))[:, None, None] * w
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y_rx = y_rx + sigma * torch.randn(n, model.P, model.L, device=DEVICE)
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r = y_rx / h[:, None, None].clamp_min(1e-6)
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if perms is not None:
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rf = r.reshape(n, d)[:, inv[decode_user]]
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r = rf.reshape(n, model.P, model.L)
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m_rx = true_m if rx_masks is None else rx_masks.to(DEVICE)
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cand = Bn * m_rx[decode_user][None, :] # (Vu,L)
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scores = torch.einsum("npl,vl->npv", r, cand)
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wrong = (scores.argmax(-1) != digits[:, decode_user]).any(dim=1)
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err += int(wrong.sum()); tot += n
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return err / tot
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def stage_E():
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"""Comparison across five schemes at 10 dB, V=65,536, user-0 metrics.
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Columns: legitimate SER; outsider-eavesdropper SER; insider SER (a
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curious legitimate user of the SAME system decoding user 0 with its
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own credentials); target-user SER under the strongest jammer the
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attacker can BUILD from public knowledge at JSR 0 dB (matched if the
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masks are public, blind if the PHY structure is secret)."""
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print("[E] scheme comparison ...")
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m = get_model(iters=4000)
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F = 400_000
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d = m.P * m.L
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set_seed(20260813)
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ew = eve_wrong_mask(m.users, m.L, seed=20260813)
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# shuffling-style multi-user adaptation: one GLOBAL secret permutation
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# shared by all users (per-user permutations break the trained
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# multi-user separation, so the shared key is the fair extension)
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gp = torch.Generator().manual_seed(11)
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gperm = torch.randperm(d, generator=gp)
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perms = gperm[None].repeat(m.users, 1)
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chance = 1.0 - (1.0 / m.vu) ** m.P
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insider_masks = torch.roll(m.masks().detach().cpu(), 1, 0) # user 1's key
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rows = []
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# S1 proposed keyed masking: per-user secret masks
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lg = eval_scheme(m, 10.0, F)
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ev = eval_scheme(m, 10.0, F, rx_masks=ew)
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ins = eval_scheme(m, 10.0, F, rx_masks=insider_masks)
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jm = eval_scheme(m, 10.0, F, jam_w="blind", jsr_db=0.0)
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rows.append(("proposed", lg, ev, ins, jm))
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# S2 public-mask superposition (no key): everyone decodes, attacker
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# builds the matched jammer
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jm2 = eval_scheme(m, 10.0, F, jam_w="matched", jsr_db=0.0)
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rows.append(("public_mask", lg, lg, lg, jm2))
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# S3 global permutation key over public masks (shuffling-style): the
|
|
# outsider lacks the permutation, but every insider holds it and the
|
|
# masks are public, so insiders decode each other
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lg3 = eval_scheme(m, 10.0, F, perms=perms)
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ev3 = eval_scheme_permuted_eve(m, 10.0, F, perms)
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jm3 = eval_scheme(m, 10.0, F, perms=perms, jam_w="blind", jsr_db=0.0)
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rows.append(("perm_key", lg3, ev3, lg3, jm3))
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# S4 per-user index cipher (one-time pad on the digits) over public
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|
# masks: content protected from outsiders and insiders, but the PHY
|
|
# is public so the matched jammer remains buildable
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|
rows.append(("index_cipher", lg, chance, chance, jm2))
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|
# S5 OMA digital, no encryption: open to everyone
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|
from sse_lib import oma_ser
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|
lg5 = oma_ser([10.0], bits=int(math.log2(m.V)))[0]
|
|
rows.append(("oma_plain", lg5, lg5, lg5, float("nan")))
|
|
|
|
write_csv(DATA / "sec_compare.csv",
|
|
["scheme", "legit_ser", "eve_out", "eve_in", "jam0_ser"], rows)
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|
for r in rows:
|
|
print(" ", r)
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|
|
|
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|
@torch.no_grad()
|
|
def eval_scheme_permuted_eve(model: SSE, snr_db, frames, perms,
|
|
chunk=100_000, seed=777):
|
|
"""Eve for S3: sees the per-user permuted tx, holds the PUBLIC masks
|
|
but not the permutation, decodes user 0 raw."""
|
|
model.eval().to(DEVICE)
|
|
Bn = model.unit_codebook()
|
|
true_m = model.masks()
|
|
c = model.c
|
|
d = model.P * model.L
|
|
sigma = snr_to_sigma2(snr_db, model.d).to(DEVICE).sqrt()
|
|
g = torch.Generator(device="cpu").manual_seed(seed + int(10 * snr_db))
|
|
err = tot = 0
|
|
for n0 in range(0, frames, chunk):
|
|
n = min(chunk, frames - n0)
|
|
digits = torch.randint(model.vu, (n, model.users, model.P),
|
|
generator=g).to(DEVICE)
|
|
e = Bn[digits] / math.sqrt(model.P)
|
|
x = e * true_m[None, :, None, :]
|
|
xf = x.reshape(n, model.users, d)
|
|
xf = torch.stack([xf[:, u][:, perms[u]] for u in range(model.users)], 1)
|
|
y = xf.reshape(n, model.users, model.P, model.L).sum(dim=1) / c
|
|
h = rayleigh_gain((n,), device=DEVICE)
|
|
y_rx = h[:, None, None] * y + sigma * torch.randn(
|
|
n, model.P, model.L, device=DEVICE)
|
|
r = y_rx / h[:, None, None].clamp_min(1e-6)
|
|
cand = Bn * true_m[0][None, :]
|
|
scores = torch.einsum("npl,vl->npv", r, cand)
|
|
wrong = (scores.argmax(-1) != digits[:, 0]).any(dim=1)
|
|
err += int(wrong.sum()); tot += n
|
|
return err / tot
|
|
|
|
|
|
def correlated_masks(true_m: torch.Tensor, rho: float, gen: torch.Generator):
|
|
"""Substitute masks with prescribed normalized correlation rho to the
|
|
true keys: mtil = rho*m + sqrt(1-rho^2)*m_perp, ||mtil|| = ||m||."""
|
|
U, Lp = true_m.shape
|
|
out = torch.empty_like(true_m)
|
|
for u in range(U):
|
|
m = true_m[u]
|
|
p = torch.randn(Lp, generator=gen)
|
|
p = p - (p @ m) / (m @ m) * m
|
|
p = p / p.norm() * m.norm()
|
|
out[u] = rho * m + math.sqrt(max(0.0, 1 - rho * rho)) * p
|
|
return out
|
|
|
|
|
|
def stage_F():
|
|
"""Attack difficulty in the style of standard security evaluations.
|
|
(i) Key sensitivity: Eve SER against the correlation rho between her
|
|
guess and the true key (avalanche-style curve).
|
|
(ii) Brute-force key search: expected Eve SER against the number of
|
|
random key guesses K, where for each trial the attacker keeps the
|
|
guess with the LARGEST correlation to the true key (a genie-aided
|
|
upper bound on any selection rule). The best-guess correlation
|
|
rho_max(K, L) is sampled by Monte Carlo and mapped through the
|
|
measured sensitivity curve of (i)."""
|
|
print("[F] attack difficulty ...")
|
|
m = get_model(iters=4000)
|
|
F = 200_000
|
|
true_m = m.masks().detach().cpu()
|
|
gen = torch.Generator().manual_seed(31)
|
|
|
|
# (i) sensitivity curve, densest where the curve falls steeply
|
|
rhos = [0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75,
|
|
0.8, 0.84, 0.88, 0.90, 0.92, 0.94, 0.96, 0.97, 0.98,
|
|
0.99, 0.995, 1.0]
|
|
sens = []
|
|
for rho in rhos:
|
|
mt = correlated_masks(true_m, rho, gen)
|
|
ser = eval_ser_eve(m, mt, [10.0], frames=F)[0]
|
|
sens.append((rho, ser))
|
|
print(f" rho={rho:.2f} eve_ser={ser:.4f}")
|
|
write_csv(DATA / "sec_sens.csv", ["rho", "eve_ser"], sens)
|
|
|
|
# (ii) brute-force: sample rho_max(K, L) and interpolate SER(rho)
|
|
import numpy as np
|
|
r_arr = np.array([r for r, _ in sens])
|
|
s_arr = np.array([s for _, s in sens])
|
|
|
|
def ser_of_rho(r):
|
|
return float(np.interp(abs(r), r_arr, s_arr))
|
|
|
|
ks = [1, 10, 100, 1_000, 10_000, 100_000, 1_000_000]
|
|
rows = []
|
|
rng = np.random.default_rng(2026)
|
|
for Lp in [8, 16, 32, 64]:
|
|
for K in ks:
|
|
trials = 400
|
|
# rho of a random unit guess vs a fixed key in R^L is the
|
|
# first coordinate of a random unit vector; sample K per trial
|
|
best = np.empty(trials)
|
|
for t in range(trials):
|
|
g = rng.standard_normal((K, Lp))
|
|
g /= np.linalg.norm(g, axis=1, keepdims=True)
|
|
best[t] = np.abs(g[:, 0]).max()
|
|
ser_est = float(np.mean([ser_of_rho(b) for b in best]))
|
|
rows.append((Lp, K, float(best.mean()), ser_est))
|
|
print(f" L={Lp} done")
|
|
write_csv(DATA / "sec_brute.csv",
|
|
["L", "K", "best_rho", "eve_ser"], rows)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
print(f"device={DEVICE}")
|
|
stage_A()
|
|
stage_B()
|
|
stage_C()
|
|
stage_D()
|
|
stage_E()
|
|
stage_F()
|
|
print("[done] full-scale security CSVs in", DATA)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
main()
|