Resource-match the OMA reference in the key-length sweep (oma_ser_keylen), which gives it the L/16 combining gain the longer frame allows. The proposal now passes a resource-matched OMA by 1.27x at L=64 rather than the 4.3x reported against a fixed-d reference. Densify the JSR, sensitivity, and brute-force grids so the curves are smooth, give the index cipher its channel floor instead of error-free reception, and add the permutation-key known-plaintext attack (exp_permkpa) so Fig. 7 carries a conventional linear scheme. Add check_cov_attack.py and check_cov_ceiling.py: a referee raised a ciphertext-only second-order attack; the exact-population test shows the received covariance leaks only a sparse rank-deficient subset of the key Gram and leaves the eavesdropper at the random-guess level. Dump verify_math.csv, move the superseded V=256 pilot CSVs to data/pilot.
11 lines
857 B
CSV
11 lines
857 B
CSV
check,claim,empirical,abs_err,tol,verdict
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V1 legit self-alignment,1.0,0.9994724071424732,0.000527592857526793,0.02,PASS
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V2a eve mean advantage,0.0,0.0006469982936097643,0.0006469982936097643,0.003,PASS
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V2b eve SER @ 0dB,0.99609375,0.995,0.0010937500000000044,0.015,PASS
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V2b eve SER @ 10dB,0.99609375,0.9888333333333333,0.007260416666666658,0.015,PASS
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V2b eve SER @ 20dB,0.99609375,0.9881666666666666,0.007927083333333362,0.015,PASS
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V2b eve SER @ 80dB,0.99609375,0.9896666666666667,0.0064270833333333055,0.015,PASS
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V3b random mask E|corr|,0.09973557010035818,0.10187042771408686,0.002134857613728683,0.009973557010035819,PASS
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V4a blind jammer projection mean,0.0,0.00026396107284673695,0.00026396107284673695,0.003,PASS
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V4b blind jammer projection variance,0.01558576233568703,0.015476787953278994,0.00010897438240803532,0.0007792881167843516,PASS
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